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Human Capital, Economic Growth, and Regional Inequality in China 
 




We show how regional growth patterns in China depend on  physical,, human, and 
infrastructure capital; foreign direct investment (FDI); and market reforms, especially the 
reforms that followed Deng Xiaoping’s “South Trip” in 1992 those that resulted from 
serious hardening of budget constraints of state enterprises around 1997.  We find that 
FDI had a much larger effect on TFP growth before 1994 than after, and we attribute this 
to the encouragement of and increasing success of private and quasi-private enterprises. 
We find that human capital positively affects output per worker and productivity growth 
in our cross-provincial study.  Moreover, we find both direct and indirect effects of 
human capital on TFP growth.  The direct effect is hypothesized to come from domestic 
innovation activities, while the indirect impact is a spillover effect of human capital on 
TFP growth. We conduct cost-benefit analysis of hypothetical investments in human 
capital and infrastructure. We find that, while investment in infrastructure generates 
higher returns in the developed, eastern regions than in the interior, investing in human 
capital generates slightly higher or comparable returns in the interior regions.  We 
conclude that human capital investment in less-developed areas can improve economic 
efficiency, neither investment strategy is a magic bullet for reducing China’s regional 
income disparities.   
 
JEL Codes:   O15 O18 O47 O53 
 1.  Introduction 
This paper reports research on the effects of human capital, infrastructure capital, 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) on regional inequality and economic growth in 
China. China’s dramatic economic growth since the beginning of economic reform in 
1978 has been very uneven across regions.  We investigate these related trends for two 
reasons:  (i) to understand their causes, and (ii) to derive implications for policies to 
harness the causes of growth to reduce inequality in other countries.  We model two roles 
for human capital:  (i) educated workers embody human capital that contributes directly 
to output in the production process itself; (ii) human capital, particularly that represented 
by higher education, plays an important role in total factor productivity (TFP) growth. 
Infrastructure capital is hypothesized to affect GDP through TFP growth, as is FDI.   
We specify and estimate a provincial aggregate production function in which 
inputs are specified to include physical capital and two categories of labor: (i) less-
educated workers, those who have no junior high school education and (ii) educated 
workers, those who have some junior high school education or above.  The estimated 
output elasticities of the three inputs are used to calculate factor marginal products and 
also TFP at existing provincial factor quantities.  We then estimate a TFP growth model 
in which the arguments are human capital operating directly and through regional 
technology spillovers, infrastructure capital, physical-capital vintage effects, foreign 
direct investment, and  marketization.  FDI is treated as an endogenous variable. 
We derive three sets of hypothetical policy implications from our empirical 
results.  (1) We use our estimated production function parameters to calculate marginal 
products of labor and capital and then project how the reallocation of labor to equalize 
marginal products across regions would affect per capita GDP and the number of workers 
in each region. (2) We project results of another reallocation scenario—the impact on the 
time path of regional GDP ratios of a tax-transfer scheme that would increase investment 
in human capital and/or infrastructure capital.  (3) We calculate internal rates of return to 
policies that would reallocate resources to investment in infrastructure and human capital.  
We believe the results have important implications for an understanding of economic 
growth in general, for factors contributing to China’s rapidly rising regional inequality,   2
and for the design of policies that would lead to a more equitable distribution of the 
benefits of growth within the world’s most rapidly expanding economy. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides some 
background information.  In section 3 we lay out our methodology.  Section 4 describes 
our data.  Section 5 reports our empirical results for aggregate production functions and 
TFP-growth models.  In section 6, we conduct cost-benefit analysis by computing the 
rates of return to investment in human capital and telephone infrastructure.  In addition, 
we perform a hypothetical experiment by evaluating alternative investment strategies in 
reducing regional inequality.  Section 7 concludes and provides policy recommendations.  
The appendixes describe the construction of critical data series and provide details of 
mathematical derivations. 
 
2.  Background 
By the year 2000, China found itself with not only one of the highest rates of 
economic growth but also one of the highest degrees of rural-urban income inequality in 
the world (Yang, 2002). The rural-urban disparity feeds the wide regional economic 
inequality (Yang, 2002), which is a relatively new phenomenon in China’s last half 
century.  From the beginning of the Mao era through 1986, inequality across major 
regions (as measured by the coefficient of variation of per-capita real gross domestic 
product) trended downward, but it rose sharply in the decade of the 1990s (Figure 1).
1 
This trend is also apparent from regional per capita GDP shown in Figure 1.  The gap 
between the coastal region and other regions has increased rapidly since 1991. Figure 2 
illustrates the rising regional inequality in China since 1978, the start of economic 
reform, using the ratio of per capita GDP between the three non-coastal regions and the 
coastal region.  The industrial northeast, where per capita gross domestic product 
                                                 
1 The four regions defined in this study are: coastal (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong-Hainan); northeast (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning), interior (Inner 
Mongolia, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan-Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, 
and Shaanxi) and far west (Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang). 
 We have excluded Xizang (Tibet) 
province due to lack of data, combined Chongqing with Sichuan and Hainan with Guangdong.  The 
division of the four regions is based on the results of past research and our own judgment regarding the 
major economic and geographical clusters that characterize distinct “clubs” of economic growth and 
development in China.    3
substantially exceeded that in the coastal region at the end of the Mao fell to a position 30 
percent less than the coast by 2003.  The coast’s early advantage over the interior and far 
west soared to a ratio of approximately 2.4 by 2003.  By comparison, among the major 
regions of the United States in 2004, the ratio of the highest to lowest regional per-capita 
GDP was only 1.3 (United States Bureau of Economic Analysis, current web site).  In 
China in the year 2003, the ratio of real per-capita GDP between the wealthiest province 
and the poorest was 8.65, while in India for 2004, the comparable ratio (in nominal 
terms) was only 4.5 (Purfield, 2006).  
  
2.a Human Capital and Growth 
China’s investment in human capital beyond the level of secondary schooling has 
been small in comparison with nations at similar levels of per capita income and 
economic development, and its geographical dispersion has been large (Fleisher, 2005; 
Heckman, 2005).  In 2004, the government expenditures on education were 2.79% of 
GDP and had been below 3% in most years since 1992, much lower than the average of 
5.1% in developed countries.  As shown in Table 1, the proportion of the population with 
some college education (including graduates and postgraduates) was 0.6% in 1982 and 
had risen to only 1.3% by 1992.  Starting in 1999, the Chinese government increased the 
enrollment of college students sharply. The annual growth rate in college enrollment 
between 1999 and 2003 was 26.6% (State Statistical Bureau, Various Years).
2  However, 
by 2003, the proportion of those with at least some college in the national population was 
still quite low, at 5.2%.  The proportion of these individuals in the coastal, far west, and 
northeast regions was at least 6% in 2003, while in the interior (with nearly 52% of the 
national population) it was only 4.2%.  The proportion of adults who had at least some 
high school education or more was approximately 20% in the coastal region, 21% in the 
northeast, but 17% in the far west and 18% in the interior  regions.    
Although it has long been believed that human capital plays a fundamental role in 
economic growth, studies based on cross-country data have produced surprisingly mixed 
results (Barro, 1991, Mankiw et. al. 1992, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, Islam 1995, 
                                                 
2 The enrollment data exclude Tibet in order to be consistent with the sample of provinces that we use in 
this paper.   4
Krueger 1995, Pritchett 2001, Temple 2001). One reason for this uncertainty is that the 
impact of education has varied widely across countries because of very different 
institutions, labor markets and education quality, making it hard to identify an average 
effect (Temple 1999, Pritchett 2001). Moreover, as Pritchett (2006) points out, major 
transition economies have been excluded for data reasons from a number of important 
cross-country studies. 
China’s dramatic economic growth since the beginning of economic reform, 
along with wide regional disparities in growth, provides a very important and useful 
episode for analyzing the effects of human capital on growth.  It is widely hypothesized 
that human capital has a direct role in production through the generation of worker skills 
and also an indirect role through the facilitation of technology spillovers.  In published 
papers, Chen and Fleisher (1996), Fleisher and Chen (1997) and Démurger (2001) 
provide evidence that education at the secondary or college level helps to explain 
differences in provincial growth rates.  Liu (2007b, 2007c) demonstrates important 
external effects of human capital on productivity in rural and urban China.  Using a less 
technical approach than many studies, but one that is highly informative and suggestive, 
Sonobe et al. (2004) show that subtle and important changes in quality control, efficient 
production organization and marketing of manufactured goods among emerging private 
enterprises have been more likely to occur in firms where managers have acquired 
relatively high levels of education. However, the direct and indirect effect of human 
capital and especially their impacts on regional inequality in China have not been fully 
analyzed.   
Additionally, a body of research has shown that total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth has played an important role in post-reform growth in China (Chow 1993, 
Borensztein and Ostry 1996, Young 2003, Wang and Yao 2003, and Islam et al. 2006), 
but these papers do not explicitly model the role of human capital in the production 
function or its role in explaining TFP growth. This study provides a framework and 
evidence expanding our understanding the role of human capital in production and in 
TFP growth in China.   
 
2.b Foreign Direct Investment and Growth   5
China’s path toward a market economy has been much more gradual than that of 
most other formerly planned economies, in particular those of the former Soviet Union 
and Central and Eastern Europe (Fleisher, Sabirianova, and Wang, 2005), but it has not 
been a smooth path, periods of gradualism alternating with stagnation and sharp jumps.  
A significant force pushing the economy toward marketization has been the spontaneous 
growth of local private enterprises, some originating from township and village 
enterprises (TVEs).  Another major force has been the introduction of (partial) foreign 
ownership through foreign direct investment (FDI).   
The role of FDI has received much attention because of its potential for bringing 
in new production and managerial technologies, with their attendant spillovers (Liu, 
2007a).  (See Cheung and Lin, 2003 for a thorough analysis and references to earlier 
literature on FDI in China.).  FDI has facilitated the transformation of the state-owned 
and the collective sectors. The direction of FDI is obviously encouraged by exogenous 
geographical and political factors such as proximity to major ports, decisions to create 
special economic zones and free trade areas, local institutional characteristics such as 
laws and regulations, contract enforcement, and so on,, local expenditures on 
infrastructure, schools, etc, and by labor-market conditions.  Moreover, there is likely to 
be a degree of endogeneity in these relationships between FDI and TFP growth if TFP 
growth encourages FDI (Li and Liu, 2005).  One of the major features of our research is 
to incorporate the endogeneity of FDI in a model explaining China’s increased regional 
economic disparity. 
 
2.c Infrastructure and Growth 
Still another major source of growth has been investment in infrastructure capital.  
At the beginning of reform, transportation and communications infrastructure were poor, 
but governments at various levels have invested heavily in the construction of highways, 
expansion of rail systems, and development of electronic communications facilities.  
Research that neglects the marketization process, opening to the outside world, and 
investment in infrastructure capital would yield incomplete, and probably biased,   6
understanding of the role of human capital to the extent that local human capital stock is 
correlated with those factors.
3 
  
 2.d Marketization, the Profit Motive, and Hardened Budget Constraints.  
In addition to physical infrastructure discussed above, institutional infrastructure 
such as marketization can also be an important factor supporting economic growth.  As 
China’s market oriented reforms deepening, the market mechanism plays an increasing 
role in the country’s economy.  An important aspect of China’s transformation is its 
uneven pace.  It is generally agreed that a sharp acceleration in China’s gradual “growth 
out of the plan” (Naughton, 1995) followed Deng Xiaoping’s famous spring, 1992 “South 
Trip” in which he reaffirmed his belief in policies that not only allowed, but encouraged, 
Chinese citizens to follow the profit motive in the quest of personal wealth.  This trip was 
very important, because it thwarted the conservative force that tried to stop market 
oriented reform following the  Tiananmen Sqaure events of 1989. By doing so, it speeded 
the pace of transition to a market system.    
Although urban economic reform began in the period 1983-85, the Chinese 
economy was still largely operating under the old planning system before 1992, with the 
share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) accounting for more than half of gross industrial 
output.  After Deng’s visit to south China, the country moved much more quickly 
towards an open, market economy.  In the period 1992 to 1994, the share of SOEs in 
industrial output dropped 14 percentage points (from 48.1% to 34.1%), an annual rate 
over three times as rapid as during the period 1978 to 1992.  The SOE share in industrial 
output fell to 13% by 2003.   
The year 1994 marked the beginning of withdrawal of government subsidies for 
loss-incurring SOE’s, and this hardening of budget constraints  became much more 
earnest in 1997 (Appleton et al., 2002).  There was also a shift toward fiscal federalism 
after 1994 that, through separating central and local government taxation and relaxing 
ties between provincial and sub-provincial treasuries and the center, reinforced 
imposition of hard budget constraints on SOEs (Ma and Norregaard, 1998; Su and Zhao, 
                                                 
3 Fleisher and Chen (1997) and Démurger (2001), among others, provide evidence of the importance of 
infrastructure investment for productivity and economic growth in China. 
   7
2004; Qian and Weingast, 1997).  Fiscal reform made local governments responsible for 
subsidizing sub-provincial-owned state enterprises, thus providing strong incentives for 
the local governments to shift their expenditures to projects that would attract FDI, 
particularly infrastructure projects (Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 1999).  Despite the 
potential contribution of these reforms to improved economic conditions, implementation 
was by no means perfect (Ma and Norregaard, 1998).  Therefore, we account for the 
intensification in the impact of market reforms after 1994 in the specification of our 
empirical models.  
 
3.  Methodology 
We estimate provincial aggregate production functions in which inputs are 
specified to include physical capital and two categories of labor: (i) less-educated 
workers, those who have no junior high school education and (ii) educated workers, those 
who have some junior high school education or above.  The estimated output elasticities 
of the three inputs are used to calculate factor marginal products and also TFP at existing 
quantities of the inputs .  This strategy permits us to investigate two possible channels 
through which human capital may influence output.  One channel is a direct effect, in that 
educated workers should have a higher marginal product than less-educated workers.  
The second channel is indirect, through TFP growth. We hypothesize that provinces with 
a relatively large proportion of highly educated workers benefit from being able to 
develop and use new production techniques as well as from absorbing technology 
spillovers from the provinces with higher technology levels. 
The incorporation of a measure of human capital “inside” the production function 
is based on micro-level evidence that workers with more education are more productive.  
For example, in analysis of firm data for China, Fleisher and Wang (2001, 2004) and 
Fleisher, Hu, and Li (2006) find evidence that highly educated workers have significantly 
higher marginal products than workers with lower levels of schooling.  Our inclusion of 
human capital measures inside the production function is not unique.  For example, 
Mankiw et al. (1992) have done so using aggregate data. Other researchers, such as 
Nelson and Phelps (1966), Islam (1995), and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), however, 
suggest that human capital mainly operates through total factor productivity (TFP),   8
because it facilitates the development and adaptation of new technology.  We adopt a 
mixture of these approaches to estimating the impact of investment in human capital on 
output and growth. 
Another issue that must be addressed in specifying the aggregate production 
function is the intensification of the exposure of Chinese firms, in particular SOEs, to 
market competition, and government decisions to accelerate the hardening of budget 
constraints for SOEs since 1997 (Appleton, et al, 2002).  It seems likely that not only did 
SOEs increase their productivity in response to market competition reinforced by 
administrative tightening of their ability to borrow funds to offset losses, but also that 
some SOEs, at least, proved to be more formidable competitors for firms in the private 
and quasi-private sectors.  Striking (although somewhat casual) evidence of the impact of 
the acceleration of market reforms is illustrated in Figure 3.  The real GDP series and 
capital stock series are in sharp contrast to the labor series.  While GDP and capital stock 
increase at steady annual rates of about 10% and 9% per year, respectively, throughout 
the period 1985-2003, employment declines abruptly between 1997 and 1998 and grows 
very slowly through 2003. Detailed analysis of individual provinces reveals considerable 
variation in employment and output growth, with employment in Shanghai, for example 
lower in 2003 than in 1993 although GDP more than tripled over the same period; in 
contrast in western and much poorer Shanxi, employment also declined in the late 1990s, 
but by 2003 was somewhat higher than in 1996.  
Clearly, a direct impact of tightening budget constraints was on redundant 
workers in SOEs. SOEs employed more production workers than would have been 
implied by cost minimization or profit maximization (e.g, see Fleisher and Wang, 2001), 
the so-called hidden unemployment problem.  When SOEs were restructured, a large 
number of workers were laid off, especially after 1997.  These laid-off workers are 
designated as xiagang workers, which is a different category than unemployed, because 
they are still attached to their original employers and receive some benefits.  Data on the 
number of xiagang workers are reported by enterprises starting in the year 1997-
consistent with the hypothesis that the serious impact of hardened budget constraints 
began to be felt only after 1997 (Appleton et al., 2002). The xiagang series is shown in 
Figure 4.  As Figure 4 illustrates, the reported number of xiagang workers (at the national   9
level) peaked in 1997. The sharp and steady decline after 1999 occurred because laid-off 
workers may retire, become re-employed by their former enterprises or by other 
enterprises, or, after three years, they may simply be dropped from the xiagang roles.  
The impact of SOE restructuring is reflected in the number of workers, especially 
less-educated workers employed in production, with fewer workers producing more 
output.  Clearly, such a negative correlation between an input and output may lead to a 
negative estimated output elasticity.  This change in the structure of production was by no 
means equal across provinces and years, and thus fixed effects cannot control for it.
4  
Therefore, we have a particular omitted variable problem in estimating the aggregate 
production function.  A variable reflecting SOE employment efficiency is not included in 
the basic production-function specification, and it is correlated with the aggregate 
employment level, especially that of the less-educated group.  
In order to account for this problem, we have incorporated alternative proxies for 
the productivity change in specification of the aggregate production function.  The most 
general approach would be to specify provincial specific effects for each year.  However, 
we do not have sufficient degrees of freedom to implement this approach.  A less general 
alternative would be to allow each of the four regions to have regional-specific annual 
effects by interacting regional dummies with annual dummies in the estimation.  A 
similar but different approach would be to allow for province specific effects which vary 
before and after the start of SOE restructuring, i.e., to interact each province dummy with 
a year dummy that marks breaks in employment efficiency.   
The two approaches described above are more or less standard procedures in 
panel data estimation, but they are rather mechanical.  In order to find a less mechanical 
proxy for the change in employment efficiency, we have searched for more flexible ways 
to represent the hardened-budget-constraint and competitive-markets impacts.  One 
method is to define an employment efficiency variable as 
  
2
ii a Trend b Trend a
it Ee
⋅+ ⋅ =  
                                                 
4  As can be seen in the empirical result section, the estimated output elasticity for less-educated workers is 
negative in simple two-way fixed effects estimation.  The result is not surprising given that less-educated 
workers were those most heavily affected by the SOE restructuring.    10
Where Trend=0 before 1997, and for t ≥1997, Trend= t – 1996 ; αi and bi are 
provincial-specific coefficients. The provincial specific quadratic trend variable is 
designed to capture the effect of improvement in employment efficiency in the SOE 
sector that began in 1997; the quadratic feature allows for province-specific decelerating 
or accelerating adjustment paths.   
An alternative measure of the improvement in employment efficiency is to 
incorporate the xiagang series directly in the production.  We define this proxy r 
employment efficiency proxy as  
,1 [max(1 / , )]
i a b
it it it i t E xiagang SOE E − =+ , for t=1986, 87,  … , 2003. 
There were no reported xiagang workers in 1985, so Ei,1985=1.  The variable SOEt  is total 
SOE employment in year t and xiagangt  is the total number of xiagang workers reported 
in year t.  The parameter ai allows the xiagang effect to be specific for each province. The 
efficiency proxy is assumed to be monotonic with a durable increase in employment 
efficiency.  Thus we use the largest value of the ratio in any year up to the current year (t) 
as a measure of improved efficiency as of the year (t).   
Therefore, the production function including two types of labor and a proxy for 
employment efficiency is defined as:
5        
  ()
it u
it it it eit nit YA KE L Le
αβ γ =⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅     ( 1 )  
where Y is output, K is capital, Le is the number of educated workers, those with more 
than elementary school education, Ln is the number of less-educated workers, those who 
have less than junior high school education, E is one of the proxies for the improvement 
in employment efficiency as defined above, and u is a disturbance term, for province i= 1, 
2, …, n from year t=1, 2, …, T.
6  The parameters α, β, and γ are the output elasticities of 
the corresponding inputs.   
                                                 
5 Jones (2005) shows that the Cobb-Douglas form is a valid approximation in the aggregate for a variety of 
underlying micro firm production functions.  
6. In the production function, the group of workers with more schooling includes those who have gone 
beyond elementary school .  In the TFP-growth equation the group of workers with more schooling 
includes only those who have at least matriculated in senior high school. Our rationale for this distinction is 
that TFP growth is a function, in part, of technology spillovers, and we postulate that at least some senior 
high school education is necessary to be effective in absorbing technology spillovers.  It can be argued that 
the higher schooling group should be limited to workers with college diplomas, but the proportion of these 
workers in the earlier years of our sample was extremely small.  There is evidence that in the earlier stages 
of the growth of private enterprises in China, important advances in marketing strategies, quality control,   11
            The above production equation is estimated in a two-way fixed effects model.  
Moreover, we will also apply the Common Correlated Effects Pooled (CCEP) estimator 
developed by Pesaran (2006) to take into account cross province dependence in our data; 
and we use a standard error estimator that is robust to serial correlation, 
heterosckedasticity, and cross-sectional correlation in panel data (Driscoll and Kraay 
1998).  
In addition to its direct effect on output, human capital is believed to facilitate 
development and adoption of new technology, which is reflected in TFP.  Thus, we 
investigate those effects of education in a TFP growth model along with other factors 
generally hypothesized to affect TFP, including FDI and local infrastructure capital.  We 
first address the role of human capital.  Following Nelson and Phelps (1966), we 
postulate that the diffusion of technology is positively related to human capital.  Nelson 
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so that the growth rate of TFP is dependent on human capital (h) and the gap between its 
actual level and a hypothetical maximum level of TFP (
*







 represents the technology gap, and  () h Φ  represents the ability to adopt and 
adapt the technology, which is an increasing function of human capital (h).  Thus, the 
new technology developed by an advanced region can have spillover effects to the benefit 
of poorer regions.  Equation (2) describes the process of technological diffusion in what 
might be characterized as a learning-by-watching process.   
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) extend Nelson and Phelps’ (1966) framework to 
include domestic innovation.  They specify TFP growth as a function of human capital, 
and human capital is modeled to have both a direct effect (innovation) and an indirect 
spillover effect working through technological diffusion.  The indirect effect is captured 
by the interaction of human capital and the output gap:  
                                                                                                                                                 
and enterprise organization occurred in firms whose management had more than elementary, but less than 
college education (Sonobe, et al, 2004).    12
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where  max Y  is  the highest level of provincial output in the regions studied (e.g., provinces 
in China),  0 TFP  is total factor productivity in the initial year, c denotes the exogenous 
progress of technology,  i gh  represents domestic innovation, and  max [( )/ ] ii i mh Y Y Y −  
denotes technology diffusion.   
  Our full model represents provincial TFP growth as a function of human capital, 
infrastructure capital, physical-capital vintage effects, foreign direct investment, 
marketization, and regional technology spillovers as follows: 
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To capture the impact of a break in the reform process following Deng Xiaoping’s 
“South Trip,” we impose a structural break in 1994. YB is a break dummy which is set to 
be 1 if before 1994. The journey took place in the last weeks of 1992, and a one-year lag 
in its impact seems reasonable.  The policy impact of the trip was to open the country to 
profit-seeking domestic activity, which up to this time had been most strongly 
encouraged through foreign investment in special economic zones.  Thus we should 
expect a break in the special impact of foreign investment and increase in the likelihood 
that domestic enterprises would benefit from technology spillovers. We also include a 
proxy of the degree of marketization Mkt, in the local economy, and it is measured by the 
proportion of urban labor employed in non-state owned firms.  This group of firms 
includes share holding units, joint ownership units, limited liability corporations, share-
holding corporations, and units funded from abroad, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.  
Marketization and competition should lead to higher efficiency, thus increasing  TFP 
growth due to the efficiency and competition effects across firms.   
 Tel is a proxy of telecommunication infrastructure, defined as the percentage of 
urban telephone subscribers in the population.  Road is a proxy for transportation 
infrastructure, defined as the length of road per squared kilometers. Given the possible   13
delay in their effect on TFP growth, most variables in the model are lagged.
7  The dummy 
variables  1,i η  and  2,t η  represent provincial and annual fixed effects, respectively.   
Following Wolff (1991) and Nelson (1964) we include the second difference in 
physical capital, (
2
ti K Δ ) to reflect the assumption that new capital embodies the most 
recent technology.  We use its current value to capture the current effect of the quality of 
physical capital on TFP growth and to save degree of freedom (i.e., save one year of 
data).  
We measure human capital  i h  in the TFP-growth equation as the percentage of 
the population with either (i) some college or above) or (ii) some senior high school or 
above. The impact of schooling on TFP is posited to come from the ability to invent 
and/or adapt new technology, which requires a higher level of sophistication than 
elementary school education.  Thus, the education level categories in the TFP regression 
break at a higher schooling level than do the categories in the production function.  
However, because the proportion of college-educated workers in China was extremely 
small throughout our sample period, the impact of this education group on TFP growth is 
likely to be difficult to detect in our data.  Therefore, we use two measures of the 
schooling break to see which one appears to have more impact on TFP growth.    
We assume that the technology spillover process associated with human capital is 
limited by frictions and costs positively associated with distance.  A region that is closer 
to the most advanced region is assumed to have better access to new technology than 
more distant regions.  To capture this effect, the output gap is discounted by the railway 
distance between the capital city of each province and the capital city in the province 
with the highest output per capita (which is typically Shanghai).  This distance variable is 
specified as  max_i d , and the variable  i y  denotes output per capita. Thus, we define the 












=⋅ . We impose a two-
period lag for the human capital spillover effect, because we assume that it operates with 
a longer lag than does the direct effect.  This specification also helps us to avoid a 
simultaneity arising from the construction of the spillover variable.  Since the extent of 
                                                 
7 The results are not sensitive when we lag the variables one more period in the model.    14
spillover is more likely to be affected by economic structure correlated with the uneven 
time path of reforms discussed above, we interact the spillover variable with the break 
dummy, YB, to reflect this possibility.  
We are looking for causal relationships between human capital and both 
production and TFP growth.  Therefore we must be concerned with the possibility that 
the proportion of educated persons in a province’s population is the result of high income 
or high return to schooling. Bils and Klenow (2000) argue that the cross-country 
correlation between schooling levels and TFP growth could be partly due to omitted 
variables positively related to both variables, such as property-rights enforcement and 
openness as well as an endogenous response of schooling choices to the expected return 
to investment in human capital.  Our use of data across provinces within a single country 
reduces the impact of legal-institutional differences, such as property rights definition and 
enforcement on TFP growth.  The provinces vary immensely in both the amounts spent 
on education per capita and in the proportion of provincial GDP spent on education.  
Over the period 1999-2003, the maximum-minimum ratio of per-pupil expenditure across 
provinces exceeded a factor of 10, while the ratio for proportion of GDP spent on 
education exceeded 3.5 (Heckman, 2005).  We control for the possible bias caused by 
omitted variables by using two-way fixed effect estimation. 
Another problem in obtaining unbiased estimates of the impact of human capital 
on output and growth would be “brain drain” of persons with higher levels of schooling 
from the places where they obtained their schooling to locations where their productivity 
is higher and growing faster. This possible source of bias, while present, is attenuated in 
China by interregional and interprovincial migration restrictions due to residency-permit, 
or hukou requirements, even though hukou barriers to migration are lower for college 
graduates (Liu, 2005).  Universities are located in large urban areas and provincial 
capitals, and their locations have been determined by historical factors, and political 
considerations, defense goals, and the like. Thus it is reasonable to assume that 
universities tend to generate exogenous impacts on growth rather than that their locations 
have been the result of growth.  Additionally, given that our education breaks are above 
junior high school or above elementary school, endogeneity bias is likely to be less than 
if our schooling break were for college and above, because the hukou restriction and   15
other non-market barriers are much more common for less educated workers in the 
Chinese labor market. Moreover, as Zhao (1999) shows, rural citizens tend to prefer off-
farm work in rural locations and small towns to migration to distant urban locations. For 
rural to urban migration, Li and Zahniser (2002) find that the most educated members in 
rural society are less likely to migrate.
8      
We include a variable representing foreign direct investment,  it FDI , the ratio of 
real foreign direct investment to the total work force, which is assumed to represent the 
embodiment of foreign technology. Since the impact of FDI is likely to be determined by 
the advance of marketization, we add an interaction term between FDI and the break 
dummy, FDI_YB, to control for it.   Given the probable lag between investment and 
placing new capital into production, we lag FDI two years relative to the TFP growth 
series.  Because previous FDI presumably is not affected by the current TFP growth, this 
specification also mitigates an endogeneity problem that could result from the possibility 
that locations with higher TFP growth may offer higher investment returns and thus 
attract more FDI.  However, if investors are forward looking, foreign investment may be 
correlated with future shocks in TFP, it is still possible to have correlation between 
lagged FDI and the contemporaneous errors in the model.   
To address this problem of possible endogeneity of FDI, we apply IV estimation. 
In panel data estimation, it is notoriously difficult to find good instruments for FDI 
because important exogenous variables that affect FDI are geographical, and thus fixed 
and perfectly collinear with fixed effects.  Clear examples are location relative to 
preexisting transport hubs (canals, major rivers) and port availability.
9  In the search for a 
good instrument, we turn to government policies for attracting FDI.  Since the start of 
economic reform, Chinese central government and local governments have set a variety 
of preferential policies to attract FDI, such as policies on taxation and the use of land. A 
well-known example of such a policy is to establish special economic zones (SZs).  
                                                 
8 We thank Alan de Brauw for sending us a specially compiled table from the 2000 Population Census of 
China which contains data on the fraction of 1995 college graduates of each province who lived in another 
province in 2000 and the fraction of college graduates in each province in 2000 who lived in another 
province in 1995.  When the latter fraction is subtracted from the former, the result is negative for all 
coastal provinces except Guangxi.  This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that there was net migration of 
college graduates to the coastal provinces.    
9 Hale and Long (2007) used port availability and access to domestic market of the province as an 
instrument for FDI.    16
Shenzhen is a well known special economic zone. Although some SZs have been 
established in coastal locations, others were established for political or technical reasons; 
they boast features and names such as “duty-free” zones, “high-tech zones” “opening 
zones” and so on. SZs offer a variety of preferential tax rates that are less than the 
standard 33%, according to their sub-category designations.  For example, for firms in a 
designated Special Economic Zone the tax rate is 10-15%; for those in “opening”  and 
“coastal” cities, tax rates are in the range 12-30%; firms in  “duty-free” and “high-tech 
zones” pay tax at a rate of  10-30% with the possibility of a zero tax rate for the first three 
years and half of the preferential rate for the following three years.
10  Given the political 
and technical considerations for establishing a SZ by the central government and the time 
needed to establish and implement these policies, it is reasonable to assume that they 
affect FDI but are exogenous to the current TFP growth.  Therefore, we view SZ policy 
variables as appropriate instruments for FDI. 
To construct FDI instruments, we divide the different type of SZs into three 
categories, i) National Special Economic Zone such as Shenzhen (the total number of 
such cities in a province represented by the variable Zone3 );
11 ii) Duty-free, or High-
tech, or Economic Development cities or zones (the total number of such cities or zones 
in a province represented by the variable Zone 2);
12 iii) Opening City, such as Guangzhou 
(Zone 1). For each province, we create the three instruments defined above.  These 
instruments capture preferential tax policies.  The degree of tax preference increases from 
Zone1 to Zone3. We hypothesize that the larger the value of the instrument, i.e., the more 
cities with preferential tax policy in a province, the more likely is it that the province will 
attract FDI.  There are sufficient changes in the zone variables over space and time to 
permit reasonable variation in these variables on both dimensions.  
 
4.  Data 
                                                 
10  The tax rates can be found in “Income Tax Act for Foreign Invested Firms and Foreign Firms in 
People’s Republic of China.” 
11 There are six National Special Economic Zones so far.  They are: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, 
Hainan, and Shanghai Pudong.  
12 Such a zone can be a city, like Hefei in Anhui province; or it can be an area within a city, like Zhong-
Guan-Cun in Beijing.   17
Our data are from various years of the China Statistical Yearbook, Population 
Census (1983, 1993, and 2001), Annual Population Change Survey (State Statistical 
Bureau, 1993, 1996-2000, 2002 and 2003), Hsueh, Li, and Liu (1993), Sylvie Démurger 
(personal communication), Fu (2004), and China Data Online (2008). One important 
feature of this study is that our data are not only deflated over time but also by an index 
that accounts for living-cost differences across provinces.  Therefore, our data are 
comparable across provinces where living costs are quite different. GDP and capital-
stock deflators are based on official price indexes (China Statistical Yearbook) linked to 
the 1990 national values of a typical living expenditure basket reported in Brandt and 
Holz (2006), specifying Beijing as the base province and 1990 as the base year.
13   
To estimate the capital stock for each province, we adopt Holz’s (2006) 
cumulative investment approach.  Holz’s method adjusts official data so that investment- 
and capital-stock figures more closely approximate appropriate theoretical concepts of 
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where ROFAt is “the real original value of fixed assets”, and k is “the average number of 
years between purchase and decommissioning of fixed assets” (Holz, 2006).
15  The 
variable investmenti is effective investment, defined as the product of the transfer rate and 
gross fixed capital formation.  Holz defines the transfer rate as the ratio of official 
effective investment to official total investment expenditures.
16  The variable scrap_ratei 
                                                 
13 The capital-stock deflator is constructed as follows.  The first step is to construct the implicit deflator of 
gross fixed capital formation for the period 1966-1990.  The second step is to combine the implicit deflator 
series with the official price indices of investment in fixed assets (available since 1991 from China 
Statistical Yearbook).  The third step is to construct the comparable provincial capital-stock deflator, 
assuming 50% of components in the original deflator series are comparable across provinces and the 
remaining provincial differences in the deflator series can be accounted by Brandt and Holz’s (2006) 1990 
national values of a typical living expenditure basket. 
14 An alternative approach to construct physical capital is the NIA method also discussed in Holz (2006).  
Fleisher, Li and Zhao (2006) use the NIA approach.  In this study, we apply the cumulative investment 
approach, because based on Holz (2006), this approach works better in panel data and in controlling for the 
problem caused by the official revaluations of the original values of fixed assets in 1993.  
15 Holz (2006) suggests that k = 16 or above is preferred. 
16 Due to the lack of data, we use Holz’s (2006) the estimated national transfer rates to approximate 
provincial transfer rates.   18
is set to be 1% in the initial year, and it is moved linearly up to 2.5% in 2003.
17  The 
variable Pi denotes the price index for investment.  Due to the lack of investment price 
data prior to 1991, we construct an implicit deflator for capital formation for the years 
1966 through 1990 from State Statistical Bureau (1997).
18  The initial value of fixed 
assets (OFA0) is assumed to be the nominal depreciation value over the depreciation rate, 
which is set at 0.05.  For a discussion of assumed depreciation rates see Wang and Yao 
(2003).   
The numbers of people with some college education or above and with some 
senior high school education or above are estimated based on the annual flow of college 
student enrollments and senior high school student enrollments, respectively, anchored to 
periodic population census data and annual population change survey data.  The census 
data (1982, 1990, and 2000) and the annual population change survey data (1993, 1996-
1999, 2002, and 2003) provide the proportions of people by educational levels. 
The infrastructural data are provided by Sylvie Demurger for the years 1978 
through 1998 and from State Statistical Bureau for the years 1999 through 2003.  Data on 
employed workers by education levels are obtained from the annual population change 
surveys (provided in China Statistical Yearbook) for the years 1996 through 2003; prior 
to 1996, they are estimated by assuming the educational composition of the workforce is 
the same as that of the total population. Foreign direct investment data from 1985 to 1996 
are obtained from China Statistics Press (1999).  Data after 1995 are from State Statistical 
Bureau (various years).  The original data (in U.S. dollars) are deflated using the U.S. 
GDP deflator with 1990 as the base year.  Summary statistics are reported in tables 2a, 2b 
and 2c. 
As can be seen in tables 2a, 2b and 2c, the ratio of workers with some junior high 
school education or above to those with less education averaged about 0.66 in 1985, rose 
to 0.95 in 1994 and reached 1.81 in 2003. The average ratio of individuals with at least a 
senior high school education in the population was about 9.6% in 1985, rose to 11.2% in 
1994, and reached 19.7% in 2003.  There is considerable variation in this ratio across 
                                                 
17 This imputation was kindly suggested by Carsten Holz. 
18 We first collect nominal values and real growth rates of gross fixed capital formation.  Then, we 
construct the implicit deflator as follows: [(nominal value)t / (nominal value)t-1] / (real growth rate)t =  
[(Pricet × Quantityt) / (Pricet-1 × Quantityt-1)]  / (Quantityt / Quantityt-1) = Pricet / Pricet-1.   19
provinces.  The distribution of FDI per worker also varies widely across provinces and 
has increased sharply over time.  Between 1985 and 1994, FDI jumped from $5.01 
(US)/worker to $60.56/worker; subsequently, the rate of increase was slower, reaching 
$75.35/worker in 2003. The acceleration of capital formation is distributed very 
unequally across provinces, and it exhibits a downward trend.   
Telephone infrastructure intensity increased dramatically and accelerated over the 
entire period, while road intensity increased, but more slowly, also accelerating in the 
second decade.  Market-economy development as measured by the ratio of the number of 
workers employed in urban non-state sectors to total urban employment increased 13-fold 
between 1985 and 1994 and 2.9 times between 1994 and 2003.  However, the ratio is still 
quite low in absolute terms and in comparison to other transition economies (Fleisher, 
Sabirianova, and Wang, 2005), less than 6% in 2003, and the variation across provinces 
is extremely high.  
Data for preferential tax policies are taken from the government official website 
for investment guidelines, http://www.fdi.gov.cn.  For each province, we added those 
cities to get the number of cities in each SZ category in that province for that year.  As 
can be seen in table 2a-2c, the average number of special zones in each category 
increases over time, especially from 1985 to 1994.  In this period, the national average 
number of Opening Cities increased from 0.46 to 1.21 in each province; while the 
number of Duty-Free, High-Tech, and Economic Development City/Zone increased from 
0.43 to 2.14. The increase, however, decelerated from 1994 onward as the government 
diminished the pace of granting special zone status.
19  One reason for that policy change 
was increasing pressure to stop preferential tax policy for foreign invested firms so that 
domestic and foreign firms would compete on a level field.
20 
   
                                                 
19  From 1994 to 2003, the average of Zone1 declined for some regions and at the national level. The reason 
is that some cities were left to a higher level, i.e., from Zone1 to Zone2, in later years.  
20  In 2008, the Chinese government started to implement a new law to unify tax rate for both domestic and 
foreign firms, and removed preferential tax policies for FDI.  The unified profit tax rate is 25%, 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/20070322_3258_25832.htm.    20
5. Empirical Results 
Table 3 reports estimation results for a provincial-level production function with 
two types of labor categorized according to educational attainment. All standard error 
estimates are robust to corrections for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, and cross-
sectional correlation based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998).  
Column (1) reports the standard 2-way fixed effects (FE) estimate. In this 
specification, the estimated elasticity of less-educated worker is negative and marginally 
significant.
21  The negative elasticity for less-educated workers is very robust to different 
production-function specifications and estimation methods.  For example, it remains 
negative under alternative production function forms, such as translog and CES.  In order 
to test whether the estimated negative elasticity is caused by cross-provincial correlation, 
we apply the newly developed Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator (CCEP) 
Pesaran (2006), which is consistent in the presence of cross section dependence in panel 
data.  The CCEP estimate for the elasticity of less-educated workers is also negative.
22   
The specification in column (2) adds regional-specific annual time dummies to reflect 
regional-specific annual changes in employment efficiency; the specification in column 
(3) is based on 2-way FE plus province-specific year-break dummies (=1 after 1996 and 0 
for1996 and earlier). The estimated output elasticity of less-educated labor based on these 
commonly used treatments is positive.
23  The specifications reported in columns (4) and 
(5), include a more direct proxy for improvement in SOE employment efficiency.   
In columns (2) through (5), all of which include variables to control for the 1997 
productivity shock, the sum of the estimated output elasticities ranges from 
approximately 0.55 in column (2) to slightly over 1.0 in column (5). It is plausible to 
assume constant returns to scale in the aggregate production function, and the robustness 
of our returns-to-scale estimates based on the more flexible specifications in columns (4) 
and (5) is reassuring. In column (2), the estimated capital elasticity is about 56% that of 
                                                 
21  It is negative and significant if the standard error estimate is not adjusted for error structure or is adjusted 
only for heteroskedasiticity.  
22  The CCEP estimate of elasticity for capital is 0.38, for educated labor is 0.28, and for less educated labor 
is -0.11.  
23  In column (2) with region-specific time varying effects, the estimated elasticity for less-educated 
workers is positive but insignificant.  We believe that this result is due to there being small number of 
regions, with all provinces in one region restricted to have the same annual effect.     21
more-educated labor, whereas in the three other specifications, it is greater than the 
elasticity of the more-educated labor.  In columns (2) through (5), the ratio of the 
elasticity of labor with higher education to that of labor with elementary-school education 
or less is about 8 in column (2) and about 4 in columns (3) through (5).   
We also estimated the specification of column (4) using the CCEP estimator, and 
the results are very close to each other.
24  The CCEP estimates for the elasticity of capital, 
educated labor and less-educated labor are 0.48, 0.39, and 0.10, respectively.
25  The three 
regressions specified to reflect province-specific adjustments to the 1997 productivity 
shock yield quite similar estimates of the inputs’ elasticities.  This robustness is important 
not only because it increases our confidence in the estimated parameters themselves, but 
also because the relationship among the elasticities, in particular the elasticities of the two 
labor categories, are used to derive important policy implications. In the discussion of 
sections 5.1 and 5.2,  we use the production function estimate from column (4) with 
quadratic trends.  We believe that this treatment is more general than the others; the 
following discussions and use of these results are robust to the alternative specifications 
of the production function that control for structural change in employment.
26   
 
  5.1 Provincial marginal products 
One way to view regional productivity disparities is to use the estimated 
production function to calculate provincial marginal products of labor (MPL) and capital 
(MPK) at existing factor quantities. Between 1984 and 2003, MPL of educated labor 
calculated at existing factor quantities  increased over fourfold and that of workers with 
elementary schooling or less increased more than 10-fold in the coastal region. However, 
these rates of increase were not achieved in the other three regions.  The ratios of MPL in 
                                                 
24  In this case, we use a quadratic trend in the observed common effects for the CCEP estimation.  Based 
on Pesran et al. (2006), we rescale the trend by t/T. 
25  The basic idea of CCEP is to filter individual-specific regressors by cross-section averaging and thus the 
differential effects of unobserved common factors are eliminated. For the specification of column (5), 
however, the cross-section averages of the efficiency proxy used in the production function do not change 
for a number of years due to its construction, and thus they become perfectly collinear in the CCEP 
estimation.  Therefore, we do not estimate this specification with CCEP.  
26 We use the 2-way FE estimates instead of CCEP estimates to calculate marginal products and TFP in the 
following analysis, because the CCEP estimator depends on there being a large number of cross-section 
units so that the differential effects of unobserved common factors can be eliminated by cross-section 
averaging. There are only 28 provinces in our sample, and we take this to be quite a small number. On the 
other hand, the results from both estimators are close to each other.     22
each of the three other regions to that of the coast for the two classes of labor are shown 
in figure 5. For workers in the lower schooling group, the regional ratios of MPL in the 
both interior and far west to the that in the coast declined from about 0.6  to less than 0.4, 
reflecting substantial productivity divergence.  Although the ratio for the northeast region 
also declined, it reflected productivity convergence, from a 60 percent advantage in 1985 
to approximate parity in 2003.  Ratios for workers in the higher-schooling group reflect 
productivity divergence for all three regions, especially through about 1995. Since then, 
MPL of this group in the northeast region has recovered relative to the coast, but 
remained at only 80 percent of that in the coast in 2003, compared to approximate parity 
in 1985. 
27  
MPK, which is an approximation of the rate of return to physical capital at 
existing factor quantities, started out high and has remained high (reaching over 0.3 in all 
regions except the far west in 2003).  Moreover, has converged among all regions except 
for the far west, which fell behind the other regions after 1996. The high level of MPK is 
noteworthy in the presence of  economy-wide growth in ratios of physical capital to 
labor.  An interesting question would be to ask what would happen if labor were 
reallocated among provinces to equalize marginal products.  For example, for workers 
with schooling no greater than elementary level, the reallocation (holding physical capital 
and the other labor category constant) would raise per capita GDP in the interior and far 
west by about 7% and 5% respectively, while reducing their workforces in these regions 
by almost half.  On the other hand, per capita GDP would fall in the coast and northeast 
while their workforces would absorb all the relocated labor from the other two regions.  
The social and political implication of such drastic policies would be immense, not to 
mention the attendant costs of schools, hospitals, houses, etc.  Reallocation of more-
educated workers would also result in massive population redistribution, but would 
increase regional income disparities.  We believe that policies to promote growth are 
likely to have higher payoff and to be met with greater acceptance by Chinese citizens. 
                                                 
27 It should be emphasized that the hypothetical relocation experiment involves only geographical 
reallocation of workers without specifying anything about possible misallocation among firms.  In a recent 
NBER working paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) use micro data for China and India to estimate the impact 
of misallocation of labor and capital across plants within narrowly defined industries.  They find that 
manufacturing TFP is substantially reduced as a result of interplant resource misallocation in both 
countries—by 25-40% in China and substantially more in India.   23
   
5.2 Total Factor Productivity Growth 
  TFP growth has important implications for regional disparity in China’s economic 
development. In the interior region, TFP was over 80% that of the coastal region in 1985, 
and it has fallen rather steadily to less than 70% that of the coastal region by 2003.  A 
similar picture holds for the far western region compared to the coastal region and for 
both the interior and far west relative to the northeast.  Clearly, targeting regional TFP 
growth should be an important aim of economic policy in China. 
In order to understand the determinants of TFP growth, as discussed in the 
methodology section we model TFP growth as a function of FDI, physical capital 
vintage, the degree of marketization, and human capital, with human capital operating 
through two channels, both a direct effect on TFP growth and an indirect effect through 
technology spillovers.
28  TFP growth regression results are presented in tables 4 and 5.
29  
In Table 5, variables representing infrastructure capital are added as regressors, and we 
report the results based on dynamic specifications. Table 4 reports the base results of 
three specifications, two of them using 2SLS because of the possible endogeneity of 
FDI.
30   The regressions are based on the production function reported in Table 3, column 




Columns (1) and (3) in Table 4 permit us to see the impact of using 2SLS to 
address the problem of FDI endogeneity. A Hausman test on the endogeneity of FDI 
rejects the null that FDI is exogenous. The first stage result confirms that most of the 
instruments are significant, and the overidentification test (Hansen J-statistic) does not 
reject the null hypothesis.   This result is comforting as it shows no evidence against our 
instruments.  Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4  allow us to compare the results of two 
                                                 
28 While there is little doubt that the shift of workers from low-productivity agricultural work to higher 
productivity work elsewhere has been a major force in China’s economic growth (Young, 2003), we do not 
explicitly model geographical and intersectoral migration in this paper.   
29 Since our TFP model is based on FE+IV estimation, we do not use the CCEP estimator, because it has 
not been shown that it is applicable.  
30  In tables 4 and 5, the standard error estimates for 2-way FE are robust to corrections for 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional dependence based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998).  
For the IV plus 2-way FE procedure, we use the Stata standard package xtivreg to conduct the estimation.  
As an additional check, we compare the standard errors produced by xtivreg with the ones produced by 
xtivreg2 with robust option (Schaffer, 2007), and they are similar to each other..  
31 In all regressions, the F-test on fixed effects strongly rejects the null of no fixed effects.    24
different definitions of schooling categories, above senior high school and above junior 
high school. The two most notable differences between the FE-only regression and the 
regression result based on FE plus 2SLS are (i) the estimated impact of FDI in years prior 
to 1994 is almost six times larger under 2SLS and the human capital spillover impact in 
years prior to 1994 is about 2.5 times larger.  The other estimated coefficients in the 
2SLS regressions tend, if anything, to be somewhat larger and generally no less 
significant than those estimated by FE.  The regression results are reasonably robust to 
specification of the underlying production function.
32  
The estimated impact of FDI is significant only before 1994.  In column (2), the 
magnitude of the coefficient implies that if FDI were to increase by $10/worker (the 
provincial sample mean is $78/worker in 2003), the expected TFP growth rate would 
have been 0.0488 (4.9 percentage points) more per year before 1994.  For the period 1994 
and later, the estimated economic impact of an FDI shock is much less and not 
statistically significant. We conjecture that the drop in the impact of FDI after 1994 can 
be attributed in part to the encouragement of non-government enterprises offered by 
Deng Xiaoping’s “South Trip”. Since then, private and “red-cap” enterprises (nominally 
rural collectives, but in fact privately owned) and the evolution of TVEs from collectives 
to de facto private firms have become relatively more important sources of growth, while 
the relative importance of  FDI-led growth has declined.  Consistent with this conjecture, 
Wen (2007) reports that at least since the mid 1990s, FDI has tended to crowd out 
domestic investment, more so in the non-coastal regions. A similar finding is reported for 
the early 2000’s by Ran, Voon, and Li (2007). 
The estimated direct effect of human capital is positive and significant for both 
measures of the highly educated group.  In column (3), where the schooling category is 
workers who have achieved some senior high school education or above, the coefficient 
is smaller than that when the schooling category is workers who have achieve some 
college education or above in column (2). This result is reasonable because college 
education should be able to contribute more to innovation and technology adaptation than 
education at senior high level. In column (3), the coefficient of this schooling variable 
                                                 
32  The 2SLS regression results reported in tables 4-5 are robust to the use of a number of  production 
function specifications other than those reported in table 3.   25
implies that if the proportion of workers with some senior high school or more education 
in the population increases by one-percentage point, TFP growth increases by about 0.68 
percentage point a year. This is a “large” impact, but Table 1 shows that a schooling 
shock of 1 percentage point is also large. The average annual increase in the proportion of 
workers in this group is merely 0.18 percentage points between 1982 and 1993. The 
growth rate of the proportion of workers with some senior high school or above increased 
after 1994, but the annual increase remained below one percentage point on average.  As 
can be seen, the annual increase of the proportion of workers with some college or above 
education is even slower.  Given the rather small within-sample “shocks” that our 
estimates are based on, a note of caution is called for in deriving policy implications, 
because policies that create “large” increases in the proportion of highly educated 
workers will be significantly out of the range of our sampled variation and thus subject to 
associated larger forecast errors. 
The indirect effect of human capital operating through technology spillover is 
modeled in the spillover variable, and the estimated effect is positive and significant. The 
estimated impact prior to 1994 is greater.  As hypothesized, the vintage of capital 
measured by the acceleration of new investment has a positive effect on TFP growth, 
consistent with the hypothesis that new capital embodies technological change, but the 
estimates are not statistically significant by conventional standards in column (3).  The 
estimated coefficient of the proportion of the workforce in non-state enterprises, a proxy 
for the private sector, is positive but insignificant across all specifications. 
Table 5 differs in 3 ways from Table 4: (i) two measures of physical infrastructure 
capital are included in all regressions; (ii) we include an additional lagged variable for the 
direct effect of the schooling variable in one regression to test for the lasting effect of 
human capital; (iii) the lagged dependent variable is included in one regression to test for 
possible dynamic effects. In Table 5, the education level above junior high school is used 
to measure human capital.  When we use the variable defined as some college education 
or above, it is insignificant in all specifications.  One possible reason is the higher level of 
multicollinearity due to the correlation of human capital and infrastructure; and another 
possible reason, as discussed above, is that the proportion of college educated is too small 
and thus we may not detect its effect.     26
Compared to Table 4, the estimated impact of FDI in Table 5 is somewhat 
smaller.  Another difference is that the impact of human capital in Table 5 is smaller 
when infrastructure is included, although still highly significant.  The human capital 
spillover effect, is not statistically significant before 1994 than afterward. The second-
lagged schooling variable has a smaller and insignificant effect on TFP growth than does 
the single-lagged variable.  The estimated impact of capital vintage is generally 
insignificant.   
We represent local infrastructure capital with two variables, telephone ownership 
and length of roads and highways relative to surface area of a province.  Telephone 
intensity can be viewed as a proxy of telecommunication infrastructure, while road 
intensity represents transportation infrastructure.  The telephone ownership rate has a 
positive and significant estimated effect on TFP growth, but road intensity does not.  The 
somewhat surprising result for road infrastructure could be due to a number of reasons.  
For example, given that road intensity can only change slowly over time, it is possible 
that it may be highly correlated with the fixed effects and thus becomes insignificant in 
the model. In fact, the coefficient of variation at the national level from 1985 to 2003 is 
merely 0.2, and it is even smaller for some provinces, for example, for the northeast 
region it is only 0.1. Another problem is that our data measure only road length, not road 
quality.  Unfortunately it would be a major research project in itself to get more complete 
data on road quality (width, average speed, etc.).
33  The regression reported in column (4) 
includes the lagged dependent variable.  The estimated coefficient is insignificant, 
however.     
We draw the following conclusions regarding the estimation results of alternative 
specifications and estimation procedures for the TFP growth equation.  First, FDI has a 
much larger effect on TFP growth before 1994.  After 1994, its effect is much smaller or 
statistically insignificant, and we attribute this to the growing role of locally produced 
growth engines in China’s economic progress. Second, the direct effect of human capital 
measured by the proportion of workers with greater than junior high school education is 
                                                 
33 An anecdote illustrates this point.  One of the authors journeyed by car from Hangzhou to Wenzhou in 
the summer of 2007, and one of his traveling companions noted that the approximately 4-hour travel time 
had until recently been about twice as long.  This improvement would not be reflected in our highway 
length variable, as the improvement resulted mainly from converting the traditional highway to motorway 
status.   27
positive.   Third, the spillover effect of human capital on TFP growth is positive and 
statistically significant.  There is no strong evidence that the spillover effect is larger 
before 1994.  Fourth, capital vintage always has positive but mostly statistically 
insignificant effect on TFP growth.  Finally, telecommunication infrastructure as 
measured by telephone intensity has had a positive and significant effect on TFP growth.  
The estimated coefficients for road intensity, on the other hand, are negligible. 
 
6.  Policy Implications       
In order to illustrate the economic importance of our estimation results, we 
calculate the impacts of possible policy interventions through human capital and 
infrastructure investments.  An output-maximizing policy maker would rely on rates of 
return in designing an optimal investment policy, and knowledge of these returns can be 
derived from the results of studies such as ours.  We estimate the internal rates of return 
to investment in education and telecommunication infrastructure with telephones as a 
proxy.  The internal rate of return is calculated by equalizing the estimated cost to the 
present value of estimated future benefits as reflected in the contribution to TFP growth 
or directly to production.
34  As in most cost-benefit analyses based on behavioral data, the 
rates of return we calculate are no more precise than the estimated coefficients on which 
they are based and should be interpreted with this uncertainty in mind.  Nevertheless, 
they are the best estimates available to us as a guide to intelligent policy formation.   
 
6.1 Rates of Return
35 
The returns to senior high school education and infrastructure are assumed to 
emanate from their impacts on TFP growth, while the return to junior high school 
                                                 
34 We do not compute the internal rates of return to road construction because the coefficient estimate of 
road construction is mostly insignificant. 
35 In Table 6, we report the rates of return to investment in education and telecommunications infrastructure 
based on the production function (4) from Table 3 and the TFP growth regression (2) from Table 5.  As a 
robustness check, we compute the rates of return based on various types of the production function, namely 
(2), (3) and (5) from Table 3 (we skip the production function (1) because of its negative coefficient of low-
skilled labor).  The results based on (3) and (5) are quantitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 6.  
The results based on (2) are also similar except for the rates of return to investment in education based on 
the direct contribution, which are about twice higher than the ones in Table 6, but the qualitative conclusion 
is still well maintained.  Those results are available upon request.    28
education is postulated to arise from its direct impact as a factor of production.  We 
develop simple approaches to estimate the costs of these investments.  We are relatively 
more confident in our ability to measure the costs of human-capital investment than of 
infrastructure investment, because the costs of investing in communications equipment 
are less well represented in official data.  Therefore, we believe that our returns estimates 
are more reliable for regional comparison than for comparing the relative payoffs to 
human-capital versus infrastructure-capital investments.   
In estimating the return to education based on its direct contribution on the 
production process, we assume that some of workers from the low schooling (Ln) group 
are advanced to the high schooling (Le) group through an adult education program. In 
estimating the portion of the return to education that comes from its indirect contribution 
through TFP growth on the production process, we assume that some of the workers with 
only junior high school education are selected to obtain higher levels.  Costs of education 
consist of two components: foregone production while a worker is taken out of 
production and sent to school and the direct costs of teachers, administrators, “bricks and 
mortar,” and other direct expenses of schooling.  Details of estimating the internal rates 
of return to human capital and infrastructure are given in Appendices A-C of an earlier 
version of this paper (Fleisher, Li, and Zhao, 2008) which can be accessed via the 
internet.  
The calculated internal rates of return to education are reported for each region in 
Table 6, columns (1) and (2).  Column (1) contains the estimated rates of return to 
providing schooling above the elementary level, which occurs directly in the production 
process.
36 The national average rate of return is approximately 14.4%, and it is much 
higher in the far west and interior regions (about 18.5% and 18.6%, respectively) than in 
the coastal and northeast regions (about 12% and 8.4%, respectively).  All of these 
estimates are much higher than the 7% return to education in production assumed by 
Bosworth and Collins (2008) in their work comparing TFP growth in China and India 
                                                 
36 We assume that the proportional distribution of education outcomes above elementary matches the 
current distribution.  That is, the likelihood that a student taken from the elementary group will complete 
junior high school, senior high school, or college matches the current distribution of these schooling levels 
in the population.  The rate of return estimates are quite robust to using the coefficients from any of the 
production function specifications that yield a significant estimated coefficient for less-educated workers.    29
through 2004.  Moreover, they are higher and more consistently estimated than those 
obtained in cross-country research (Pritchett, 2006).    
It is instructive to compare the estimated rates of return in Table 6 with the 
marginal products of educated labor shown in Figure 5.  It is clear that at existing factor 
quantities, the marginal product of educated labor is much higher in the coastal region 
and northeast regions than elsewhere, but so is the marginal product of less-educated 
labor.  Hence the opportunity cost of sending a coastal or northeast worker to school is 
higher than it is in the interior or far west regions.  Moreover, the marginal product of the 
less-schooled group in the coastal and northeast regions has accelerated relative to that in 
the west and far west since the mid- to late 1990s.  
The calculated rate of return per year of additional schooling to investment in 
education above junior high school based on its contribution to TFP growth is reported in 
column (2a) of Table 6.  It is based on the 2SLS estimates reported in column (4) of 
Table 5. The national average rate of return is approximately 26.8%. The interior region 
has the highest return of 28.2%.  A more complete estimate of the return to investment in 
schooling is obtained if we combine the direct and indirect effects.  Obviously, the sign 
of the net outcome on the return to schooling is ambiguous, and this ambiguity is 
illustrated in column 2b, where the combined direct and indirect impacts decrease for the 
economically advanced regions (where the marginal product of less-educated labor is 
relatively high) and increase for the interior and far west regions.  The combined effect is 
highest in the interior, followed in decreasing order by the coastal, far west and northeast 
regions.
37 Again, the indirect returns we estimate for China are higher and more 
consistently estimated than those obtain in most cross-country studies (Pritchett, 2006). 
  Column (3) in Table 6 contains the calculated rates of return for investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure based on its contribution to TFP growth.   The 
assumptions and methods used are detailed in Appendix D.  We assume zero 
maintenance costs and thus may overestimate the rates of return.  The national average 
                                                 
37 It might be argued that the rates of return calculated from our data are not good estimates of the treatment 
effect of providing more schooling to the regional populations, because of selection and sorting biases 
(Heckman and Li, 2004).  However, such biases should be mitigated in this study insofar as the 
distributions of individual comparative advantages within provinces are similar across provinces.  
Moreover, there is evidence that finance constraints are important in determining the level of schooling 
attainment in China (Heckman, 2005; Wang, Fleisher, Li, and Li, 2008).   30
rate of return to investment in telecommunication infrastructure is over 46%.
38  The 
return ranges from nearly 57% in the coastal region to approximately 38% in the far west.  
Unlike the return to human capital investment in production, the investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure appears to be positively correlated with local 
development, being higher in the relatively developed northeast and coastal regions.  We 
conjecture that this regional pattern is attributable to scale effects, and it implies that 
infrastructure investments directed toward regions with the highest returns are not likely 
to reduce regional inequality.  Rather they are likely to increase regional disparities.  
Human capital investment, however, generates higher or comparable return in less-
developed regions than that in developed regions.  Therefore, although both policies have 
a high impact on growth, investing in human capital would be a more effective policy to 
reduce regional income gaps. 
  
6.2 Hypothetical Policy Experiments  
Given that the starting point of this paper was the observation that regional 
inequality in China has soared, it is interesting to perform a hypothetical policy 
experiment.  Suppose, for example, that the central government were to invest in human 
capital or telecommunication infrastructure in the northeast, far west and interior regions 
in order to reduce the regional per-capita output gaps.  We assume that there are five 
phases in this hypothetical investment project (each phase lasts a year).  In each phase, 
the central government would distribute 10% of their annual revenue to the non-coastal 
regions (weighed by their population size) to carry out the investment project.  The first 
investment would yield returns starting in 2004, and the last investment would yield 
returns in 2008.   
We analyze two scenarios: (1) allocation to increase the number of students 
advancing beyond elementary school, distributed in proportion to the current distribution 
of schooling in the workforce within each region; (2) investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure. Assume the burden of the tax is on consumption expenditure in the year it 
is imposed.  We use the regression results underlying the rate of return estimates reported 
                                                 
38 Given the difficulty in estimating the cost of infrastructure and education, we do not compare the rates of 
return between different types of investment.     31
in Table 6 to discuss these policy alternatives in terms of their ability to reduce regional 
inequality over a 10-year horizon through 2013.  Details of the derivations and 
calculations are reported in appendix E.  Table 7 shows the impacts of these alternative 
projects.  In our calculation of policy impacts, we ignore the deadweight loss that would 
be associated with almost any tax-redistribution policy.  Calculation of such losses and 
comparing them with possible policy gains is beyond the scope of this paper, although a 
worthwhile endeavor for future research. 
  The first line of each cell in Table 7 is the predicted ratio of per-capita GDP in 
one of the other three regions to the coastal region if one of the three policy actions is 
undertaken.
39  The last row shows the predicted regional GDP ratio if no policy is 
undertaken, and the second line of each cell is the difference between the no-policy ratio 
and the ratio under a given policy.  Finally, the third line in each cell shows the 
percentage decline in the provincial GDP ratio under each policy.  For example, the 
number 0.537 in the first line of the last column indicates that a policy of increasing 
schooling above the elementary level in the interior region, with no change in the coastal 
region, would increase the interior/coast inequality ratio from 0.409 to 0.537, or by 
approximately 31.3% of the 2003 ratio by the year 2013.  In the first row, we see that the 
impact of a policy focused on raising schooling levels education would have a 
substantially larger impact on reducing regional inequality in the interior than in far west.  
The same policy applied to the northeast region would reduce the income gap by only 
about 7.9%. In the second row of Table 7, we see that investment in telecommunication 
infrastructure would reduce the income gap by about 33.6% across all three non-coastal 
regions.   
 
7.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
  China’s spectacular economic growth has benefited its provinces and regions 
quite unequally. China has not only one of the highest rates of economic growth but also 
one of the highest degrees of regional income inequality in the world.  We investigate the 
determinants of the regional dispersion in rates of economic growth and TFP growth.  We 
                                                 
39 The policy actions are applied only to the non-coastal regions.  The 2013 per-capita GDP in the coastal 
region is predicted without any policy intervention.   32
hypothesize that they can be understood as a function of several interrelated factors, 
which include investment in physical capital, human capital, and infrastructure capital; 
the infusion of new technology and its regional spread; and market reforms, with a major 
step forward occurring following Deng Xiaoping’s “South Trip” in 1992 and following 
the serious budget-constraint hardening that occurred in 1997 and subsequent years.   
  Our empirical results are robust to alternative model specifications and estimation 
methods.  First, FDI had much larger effect on TFP growth before 1994.  After 1994, its 
effect becomes negligible. The diminished impact of FDI in the later stage of economic 
transition is consistent with the hypothesis that the acceleration of market reforms 
reduced the impact of FDI on technology transmission, not because technological 
advance became less important, but because the channels of its dissemination became 
more diffuse. We find that telecommunication infrastructure, which we measure by the 
intensity of urban telephone subscribers, has a positive effect on TFP growth, but that the 
impact of transportation infrastructure, which we measure by road intensity, is 
imprecisely estimated.  
We find that human capital positively affects output in three ways. First, educated 
labor makes a direct contribution to production.  Workers with more than elementary 
school education have a much higher marginal product than labor with no higher than 
elementary schooling.  Second, we estimate a positive, direct effect of human capital 
(measured by the proportion of workers with some senior high school education or 
above) on TFP growth.  This direct effect is hypothesized to come from domestic 
innovation activities.  Third, we present evidence of an indirect spillover effect of human 
capital on TFP growth. 
We derive cost-benefit analysis of possible policies to raise GDP using an internal 
rate of return metric and obtain results from a policy “experiment” in which we project 
the impact of increases in human capital and infrastructure capital on regional inequality. 
We find that, while investment in infrastructure generates higher returns in the developed 
regions, investing in human capital generates higher or comparable returns in less-
developed regions.  Therefore, we conclude that human capital investment in less-
developed areas can achieve economic efficiency and reduce inequality.  We present 
these estimates as our best effort to construct a framework for the formulation of   33
beneficial policies. The robustness of our estimation results to alternative specifications 
makes us reasonably confident that our estimated returns to investment, particularly in 
human capital, would not seriously mislead policy makers.   
Based on the policy impacts reported in Table 7, we find the following results.  
(1) The interior region would gain substantially relative to the coast from increasing both 
the stock of human and infrastructure (telecommunications) capital.  (2) The far west 
would also experience a significant gain in relative GDP per capita. (3) The gain for all 
three regions would be similar from infrastructure investment.  
We find evidence that China’s transition toward a market economy accelerated 
after 1994. But Chinese policy makers face a dilemma, because continued economic 
transformation has not been equally beneficial across China’s major regions.  The interior 
region (near west) and far western regions lag far behind the coastal and northeast regions 
in economic progress. There is an important implication of our research findings for 
China’s on-going Go-West, formally known as the “Grand Western Development” 
Project, which was launched in 2000.  It encompasses eleven provinces including the 
entire far west region as defined in this paper and five provinces in our interior region. 
The largest part of expenditure mandating from this project is focused on investment in 
infrastructure.  Between 2000 and 2005, the cumulative investment in infrastructure was 
about 1 trillion Yuan (about US$121 billion).
40 The results of our research imply that, it 
is important to put human capital investment on an equal footing in this project, both for 
reasons of economic efficiency and for reducing inequality.  
                                                 
40 http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34961/70385/70386/4783169.html [Access Date: January 23, 2007].   34
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Table 1  
High School and College Graduates (%) 
  Some Senior high School or Above / Population  Some College or Above / Population 
  Coastal Northeast  Far 
West  Interior   National  Coastal Northeast Far 
West  Interior   National 
1982  8.28  10.54 6.68 5.95 7.19 0.74 0.86 0.61 0.46 0.60
1983  8.70  11.15 7.04 6.23 7.55 1.07 1.41 0.94 0.67 0.88
1984  8.95  11.62 7.54 6.47 7.82 1.12 1.47 0.97 0.70 0.92
1985  9.22  12.13 8.06 6.72 8.11 1.18 1.54 1.02 0.73 0.97
1986  9.47  12.58 8.57 6.95 8.38 1.23 1.61 1.05 0.76 1.01
1987  9.71  12.96 9.06 7.17 8.63 1.28 1.68 1.08 0.80 1.05
1988  9.95  13.31 9.53 7.37 8.86 1.34 1.75 1.12 0.83 1.10
1989  10.17  13.60 9.96 7.58 9.09 1.39 1.80 1.15 0.86 1.13
1990  10.35  14.02 10.09 7.78 9.30 1.66 2.33 1.42 1.05 1.39
1991  9.30  12.88 8.97 7.10 8.43 1.52 2.22 1.38 0.94 1.27
1992  9.60  13.26 9.32 7.36 8.72 1.58 2.30 1.41 0.98 1.32
1993  8.66  12.14 8.18 6.73 7.92 1.48 2.22 1.39 0.89 1.23
1994  9.86  13.88 10.06 7.79 9.12 1.82 2.77 2.08 1.25 1.61
1995  10.28  14.28 10.34 8.12 9.48 1.89 2.86 2.10 1.30 1.67
1996  11.50  15.85 12.18 9.17 10.67 2.22 3.37 2.77 1.65 2.04
1997  13.54  17.69 12.25 10.23 12.09 2.80 4.97 2.82 1.92 2.52
1998  14.35  17.09 12.54 10.52 12.48 3.15 4.24 3.17 1.91 2.59
1999  14.97  17.23 14.51 10.60 12.83 3.52 4.54 3.98 2.10 2.87
2000  16.61  19.01 14.03 12.27 14.46 4.09 5.30 3.55 2.77 3.49
2001  18.16  19.13 15.55 12.80 15.31 4.89 5.26 4.41 3.06 3.94
2002  19.11  19.29 16.75 13.56 16.10 5.59 5.28 5.21 3.45 4.42
2003  20.27  21.32 17.39 15.52 17.73 6.20 6.58 6.00 4.19 5.17
                            
Notes:  
1. Tibet is excluded for lack of continuous data.   42
Table 2a 
Summary Statistics - 1985 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Variable 
1985 
Coastal  Northeast  Far West  Interior   National
GDP  622.75 547.48 116.05 464.61 474.53
(100,000,000  yuan)  (284.34) (241.10)  (73.06) (235.48) (280.07)
Capital  1081.91  1386.15 216.78 914.22 919.05
(100,000,000  yuan)  (546.06) (600.75) (102.67) (654.97) (630.22)
Less-educated workers, 
elementary  or  below  1107.22  596.67  317.17 1405.07 1067.31
(10,000  workers)  (816.84) (136.38) (291.05) (835.83) (807.66)
Educated workers, some junior 
high school education or above  854.54  732.96  184.66  747.65  700.00
(10,000  workers)  (446.34) (286.95) (147.08) (394.38) (423.48)
FDI  /  total  workforce  14.70 0.52 0.21 0.45 5.01
(1 US dollars per worker)  (24.48)  (0.45)  (0.15)  (0.47)  (14.96)
Human-capital  spillover  0.22 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.17
   (0.23)  (0.04)  (0.05) (0.09) (0.14)
Capital  vintage  0.0092 0.0103 0.0147 0.0036 0.0077
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban telephone subscribers / 
population  5.70 3.75 2.69 1.54 3.28
(1  subscriber/  1000  person)  (5.66) (0.66) (0.80) (0.71) (3.63)
Roads  /  area  0.30 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.20
(km length per km
2)  (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.11)
Urban non-state workforce / total 
workforce  20.67 23.05  2.27  1.96 10.28
(1 person / 10000 persons)  (13.71)  (36.33)  (1.24)  (1.89)  (15.79)
Zone1  1.33  0  0 0.08 0.46 
 (1.66)  .  .  (0.29) (1.10) 
Zone2  1.22 0.33  0  0 0.43 
 (0.67)  (0.58) . .  (0.69) 
Zone3  0.56 0 0 0  0.18 
  (1.33) . . .  (0.77) 
 
Notes: 
1. All the monetary values were deflated with the base of Beijing 1990.  The means are the provincial 
average, and the Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
2. Hainan is included in Guangdong; and Chongqing is included in Sichuan. Tibet is excluded for lack of 
continuous data. 
3.  Human-capital spillover and Capital vintage is defined in the text. . 
4. “Urban non-state workforce” are employed in share holding units, joint ownership units, limited liability 
corporations, share-holding corporations, and units funded from abroad, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
5. Zone1 represents the total number of Opening Cities in a province; Zone2 is the total number of Duty-
Free Cities, High-Tech, or Economic Development Cities or Zones in a province, and Zone3 is the number 
of National Special Economic Zones in a province.  




Summary Statistics - 1994 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Variable 
1994 
Coastal  Northeast  Far West  Interior   National
GDP  1790.38 1140.95  263.73 1008.58 1167.65
(100,000,000  yuan)  (984.07) (522.66) (195.26) (517.53) (825.93)
Capital  2924.61 2522.14  562.89 1807.05 2065.15
(100,000,000  yuan)  (1385.08) (1043.59)  (352.57) (1037.42) (1317.10)
Less-educated workers, 
elementary  or  below  1152.09  534.92  321.34 1515.77 1123.15
(10,000  workers)  (882.96) (102.36) (262.93) (863.82) (863.67)
Educated workers, some junior 
high school education or above  1258.13  1059.64  243.44  1202.64  1068.12
(10,000  workers)  (715.30) (282.32) (182.17) (673.56) (683.27)
FDI  /  total  workforce  157.67 35.79  7.21 11.71 60.56
(1 US dollars per worker)  (118.34)  (24.52)  (8.09)  (7.81)  (94.45)
Human-capital  spillover  0.16 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.18
   (0.16)  (0.05)  (0.06) (0.10) (0.12)
Capital  vintage  0.0105  -0.0008  -0.0016 0.0025 0.0041
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Urban telephone subscribers / 
population  46.32 30.35 14.31 11.21 24.99
(1 subscriber/ 1000 person)  (37.47)  (3.48)  (3.59)  (3.54)  (26.07)
Roads  /  area  0.40 0.18 0.06 0.20 0.24
(km length per km
2)  (0.15) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.16)
Urban non-state workforce / total 
workforce  334.34 170.94  33.69  47.32 150.88
(1 person / 10000 persons)  (228.57)  (83.00)  (27.82)  (28.68)  (185.68)
Zone1  1.44 2.33 1.25 0.75 1.21 
  (1.51) (1.53) (1.26) (1.36) (1.42) 
Zone2  3.33 2.67 0.50 1.67 2.14 
  (2.60) (1.15) (0.58) (0.65) (1.82) 
Zone3  0.67 0 0 0  0.21
  (1.32) . . .  (0.79)
 
See note in table 2a 




Summary Statistics - 2003 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Variable 
2003 
Coastal  Northeast  Far West  Interior   National
GDP  4807.25 2525.77  586.49 2381.41 2920.19
(100,000,000  yuan)  (2648.19) (1082.18)  (412.06) (1224.35) (2221.34)
Capital  7899.16 4163.88 1208.88 3836.44 4802.03
(100,000,000  yuan)  (3708.76) (1525.63)  (796.81) (2242.13) (3454.90)
Less-educated workers, 
elementary  or  below  781.39 363.99 288.59  1149.39 823.98
(10,000  workers)  (590.34)  (71.72) (240.15) (666.37) (636.08)
Educated workers, some junior 
high school education or above  1784.39  1145.45  353.96  1729.08  1487.88
(10,000  workers)  (1101.59)  (356.09)  (258.45) (1012.58) (1026.04)
FDI  /  total  workforce  193.84 48.51  3.80 17.03 75.35
(1 US dollars per worker)  (151.44)  (58.74)  (2.93)  (18.81)  (119.27)
Human-capital  spillover  0.23 0.17 0.23 0.43 0.31
   (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.09) (0.23) (0.21)
Capital  vintage  0.0011 0.0008 0.0003 0.0069 0.0034
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Urban telephone subscribers / 
population  243.07 180.78 128.75  96.97 157.45
(1  subscriber/  1000  person)  (124.35) (31.45) (22.32) (26.16) (96.13)
Roads  /  area  0.65 0.24 0.09 0.34 0.39
(km length per km
2)  (0.25) (0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.26)
Urban non-state workforce / total 
workforce  1047.43 627.03 409.52 291.14 587.13
(1 person / 10000 persons)  (754.43)  (89.06)  (266.58)  (136.30)  (546.91)
Zone1  1.56 2.33 0.75 0.67 1.14 
  (1.59) (1.53) (1.50) (1.23) (1.46) 
Zone2  3.33 2.67 1.25 1.83 2.32 
  (2.60) (1.15) (0.50) (0.72) (1.72) 
Zone3  0.67 0 0 0  0.21
  (1.32) . . .  (0.79)
 
See note in table 2a   45
 
Table 3   
Production Function Estimates 1985-2003 
 































 (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.051)  (0.030)  (0.042) 






 (0.073)  (0.069)  (0.100)  (0.057)  (0.082) 




 (0.064)  (0.053)  (0.037)  (0.028)  (0.030) 
N 28  28  28  28  28 
T 19  19  19  19  19 
Within R-square  0.984  0.991  0.991  0.992  0.991 
F Test for No Fixed 
Effects:  













1. Hainan is included in Guangdong; and Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  Tibet is excluded for lack 
of continuous data. 
2. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.  The stars 
*, 
** and 
*** indicate the significance level at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
3.  “GDP”: 100,000,000 yuan.  “Capital”: 100,000,000 yuan.  “Educated worker”: 10,000 workers.  
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Table 4 





Two-way FE + 2SLS 
Dependent variable: log(TFPt) –  log(TFPt-1)  (1) 
PF table 3(4) 
(2) 
PF table 3(4) 
(3) 
PF table 3(4) 
FDIt-2 0.077  0.285  0.266 
   (0.061)  (0.181)  (0.178) 




   (0.395)  (1.926)  (1.937) 
Some college or above t-1  0.238 0.919
*  
   (0.212)  (0.542)   
Some senior high school or above t-1    0.677
** 
     (0.265) 




   (0.196)  (0.215)  (0.069) 
Human capital spillover t-2 * Year 1994  0.238  0.661
** 0.076 
   (0.252)  (0.313)  (0.047) 
Capital Vintage t 0.251
* 0.349
* 0.249 
   (0.144)  (0.185)  (0.179) 




N 28  28  28 
T 16  16  16 
Within R-square  0.499  0.213  0.241 
Test for No Fixed Effects:  







Test for Overidentifying Restrictions (Sargan-





Hausman Test for Endogeneity:  







1. Hainan is included in Guangdong; and Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  Tibet is excluded for lack 
of continuous data. 
2. Year 1994 = 1 if year < 1994; 0 otherwise. 
3. Standard errors are in the parentheses.  The stars 
*, 
** and 
***, indicate the significance levels at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.  
4. “FDI”: 1,000 US dollars per worker. All the monetary values were deflated with the base of Beijing 
1990.  “Some college or above”: the proportion of population with education that are beyond the senior 
high school.  “Some senior high school or above”: the proportion of population with education that are 
beyond the junior high school. “Capital Vintage”: double difference of log Capital.  “Human capital 
spillover” variable is defined in the text.  “Non-state Workforce” is the proportion of urban labor 
employed in non-state owned firms.  
5. In the 2SLS estimation, Zone1, Zone2, and Zone3 are used as instrumental variables. 
6. “h” in the human capital spillover variable in Column (3) is based on “some senior high school or 
above.”   
   47
Table 5 
TFP growth regressions with infrastructure variables 1988-2003 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




2-way FE + 2SLS 
PF table 3(4) 
FDIt-2  0.083 0.059 0.093  0.080 
    (0.050) (0.149) (0.161)  (0.156) 





    (0.367) (1.597) (1.676)  (1.718) 





  (0.133) (0.221) (0.210)  (0.226) 
Some senior high school or above t-2     0.300   
     (0.248)   





    (0.052) (0.061) (0.065)  (0.066) 
Human capital spillover t-2 * Year 1994  -0.006  0.047  0.056  0.047 
    (0.039) (0.040) (0.043)  (0.041) 
Capital vintage t  0.201 0.203 0.219  0.293
* 






    (0.137) (0.164) (0.168)  (0.172) 
Roads t-2  -0.003 0.051 0.043  0.055 
    (0.030) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.050) 
Non-state workforcet-1  -0.366 -0.286 -0.306  -0.297 
    (0.222) (0.278) (0.283)  (0.285) 
log(TFPt-1) –  log(TFPt-2)      -0.106 
      (0.066) 
N  28 28 28  28 
T  16 16 16  16 
With  R-square  0.524 0.400 0.386  0.370 
Test for No Fixed Effects:  









Test for Overidentifying Restrictions (Sargan-







Hausman Test for Endogeneity:  









1. Hainan is included in Guangdong; and Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  Tibet is excluded for lack of 
continuous data. 
2. Year 1994 = 1 if year < 1994; 0 otherwise. 
3. Standard errors are in the parentheses.  The stars 
*, 
** and 
*** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively.  
5. “FDI”: 1,000 US dollars per worker.  All the monetary values were deflated with the base of Beijing 1990.  
“Some senior high school or above”: the proportion of population with education that are beyond the junior 
high school.  “Capital Vintage”: double difference of log Capital.  “Telephone”: the proportion of urban 
telephone subscribers in the population.  “Road”: km per km
2.  “Non-state Workforce” is the proportion of 
urban labor employed in non-state owned firms. “Human capital spillover” variable is defined in the text.   
6.  In the 2SLS estimation, Zone1, Zone2, and Zone3 are used as instrumental variables.   















Investment in Education above 
Junior High School 
(3) 
Indirect Contribution to 















Coastal 0.123 0.280 0.260 0.566
Northeast 0.084 0.277 0.237 0.525
Far West  0.185 0.232 0.259 0.378
Interior   0.186 0.282 0.289 0.390
National 0.144 0.268 0.261 0.465
 
Note: 
1. Production function: (4) in table 3; TFP growth regression: (2) in table 5. 
2. The derivations of the rates of return (
s
i ρ ) are provided in Appendix A-D.   
3. National calculations are arithmetic means of the constituent regions. 
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Table 7  
Impact on Regional Ratios of Per-Capita GDP under Alternative Hypothetical 
Policy Scenarios in 2013 
 
  NE/Coastal FW/Coastal Interior  /Coastal 
Human Capital (Direct + Indirect Contribution) 
Increase compared to No Policy 











Increase compared to No Policy 











Predicted ratios without any policy imposed  0.885  0.375  0.409 
 
Notes: 
1. Full details of the derivation are provided in Appendix E. 
2. For Telecommunication, the percentages of increase in the ratios are identical across regions.  The reason 
is as follows.  The formula for computing “% of Increase in the Ratios” for Telecommunication is 
exp(β
t·z·gi/Populationi) – 1. β
t (from the TFP growth equation) and z (function of depreciation) are 
constants.  The variable gi is the increase in the telecommunication infrastructure in each phase of the 
investment project.  Since the investment funding received by each region is distributed according to its 
population size and the unit cost of telecommunication is set to be the same across regions, gi/Populationi 
will be identical across regions.   50
























































































































































Sources of data: various years of the China Statistical Yearbook and China Data Online (2008).   51

























































































































Sources of data: various years of the China Statistical Yearbook and China Data Online (2008). 
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Figure 3 Labor, Capital and Real GDP 
 
Notes: 
1. Sources of data: various years of the China Statistical Yearbook and China Data Online (2008).  
2. The capital stock was estimated using Holz’s (2006) cumulative investment approach.   53






































Sources of data: various years of China labor statistical Yearbook 
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Figure 5 Marginal Product of Labor at Current Factor Quantities 
Regional Ratios to Coast 
 
Note: Marginal products are computed based on production function estimates shown in Table 3 (4), using mean year-specific regional factor quantities.    55
Figure 6 Marginal Product of Capital 
 
 
Note: Marginal products are computed based on production function estimates shown in Table 3 (4), using mean year-specific regional factor quantities.   56
Appendix 
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A. The Rate of Return to Education Based on Its Direct Contribution 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: each provincial government is going to launch an adult education program to move some of the workers from 
the low schooling (Ln) group to the high schooling (Le) group.  The goal of this exercise is to measure the rate of return to 
education based on its direct contribution on the production process.   
o  The future output in the absence of the adult education program is projected assuming all the variables stay constant (i.e., 
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Return to Education Based on Its Direct Contribution: 
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The cost of investment per year: 
  Direct cost:     Di   58





















β ⋅+  
Since Le is defined as “above elementary school,” we should maintain the same composition of the three education groups (namely 
lower middle school, upper middle school, and college) for computing the cost of the adult education program. The lengths of the 
lower middle school, the upper middle school, and the college educations are assumed to be three years, three years, and four years, 
respectively.   
 
Let xi, yi, and zi be the proportions of workers who have received lower middle school, upper middle school and college education in 
province i in 2003, respectively (note: xi includes yi, and yi includes zi).  If there are  i dL  number of workers who participate in the 
adult education program, then there will be ( / ) ii i y xd L ⋅  number of the workers who will continue to upper middle school education, 
and ( / ) ii i zxd L ⋅  number of the workers who will continue to college education in order to maintain the same composition of the three 
education groups. 
 

























β ⋅+ , respectively.  The length of lower middle school education is Nl –year; the length of upper middle school 
education is Nu –year; the length of college education is Nc -year. 
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B. The Rate of Return to Education Based on Its Indirect Contribution 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: each provincial government is going to launch an adult education program to raise the level of schooling 
achieved beyond the nine-year compulsory education requirement.  To do this, some of the workers who are in the high 
schooling group (Le) and haven’t received beyond lower middle school education are randomly selected to obtain higher 
levels.  The goal of this exercise is to measure the rate of return to education based on its indirect contribution through TFP 
growth on the production process. 
o  The future output in the absence of the adult education program is projected assuming all the variables stay constant (i.e., 
,1 ,2 ... ei ei t ei t LL L ++ === ;  ,1 ,2 ... ni ni t ni t LL L ++ === ;  ,1 ,2 ... ii t i t Population Population Population ++ = == ), so the annual growth of 




log log ii y i y
y
wT F P T F P −
=
=− ∑  
o  After the completion of the adult education program, the workers would be sent to work for N2 years (starting at time t+1, with 
constant population i Population ). 
o  Let hi and Ei denote the proportions of people and workers who have received education that is beyond the level of the nine-
year compulsory education in province i, respectively.   61
ii i i Workforce dE Population dh ⋅= ⋅    (True under our policy scenario) 
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Based on the TFP Growth Equation, 
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Note: Other variables are not the functions of h.   
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Return to education at time t+3: 
,3
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i h
it i i Ye d h φϑ
ϒ ⋅ +⋅  
Return to education at time t+4: 
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The cost of investment per year:  
  Direct cost:     Di 
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β ⋅⋅ +  
Since hi is defined as the proportion of the people who have received education that is beyond the level the nine-year compulsory 
education, we should maintain the same composition of the two education groups (namely upper middle school and college) for 
computing the cost of the adult education program. The lengths of the upper middle school and the college educations are assumed to 
be three years and four years, respectively. 
 
Let yi, and zi be the proportions of workers who have received upper middle school and college education in province i in 2003, 
respectively (note: yi includes zi).  If there are  i dL  number of workers who participate in the adult education program, then there will 
be ( / ) ii i zyd L ⋅  number of workers who will continue to college education in order to maintain the same composition of the two 
education groups. 
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β ⋅⋅ + , respectively.  The length of upper middle school education is Nu –year, and the length of college 
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C. The Rate of Return to Education Based on Its Direct and Indirect Contribution 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: each provincial government is going to launch an adult education program to raise the level of schooling 
achieved beyond the nine-year compulsory education requirement.  To do this, some of the workers who are in the low   64
schooling group (Ln) are randomly selected to obtain higher education.  The goal of this exercise is to measure the rate of 
return to education based on both its direct and indirect contributions on the production process. 
o  The future output in the absence of the adult education program is projected assuming all the variables stay constant (i.e., 
,1 ,2 ... ei ei t ei t LL L ++ === ;  ,1 ,2 ... ni ni t ni t LL L ++ === ;  ,1 ,2 ... ii t i t Population Population Population ++ = == ), so the annual growth of 
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o  After the completion of the adult education program, the workers would be sent to work for N2 years (starting at time t+1, with 
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o  Let hi and Ei denote the proportions of people and workers who have received education that is beyond the level of the nine-
year compulsory education in province i, respectively. 
/ ii i dh dL Population =    (True under our policy scenario) 
,1 ,2 ... ii t i t dE dE dE ++ === , 
,1 ,2 ... ii t i t dh dh dh ++ ===  
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Investment Cost:   65
The cost of investment per year: 
  Direct cost:     Di 





















β ⋅+  
 
Since hi is defined as the proportion of the people who have received education that is beyond the level the nine-year compulsory 
education, we should maintain the same composition of the two education groups (namely upper middle school and college) for 
computing the cost of the adult education program. The lengths of the lower middle school, the upper middle school, and the college 
educations are assumed to be three years, three years, and four years, respectively. 
 
Let yi, and zi be the proportions of workers who have received upper middle school and college education in province i in 2003, 
respectively (note: yi includes zi).  If there are  i dL  number of workers who participate in the adult education program, then there will 
be ( / ) ii i zyd L ⋅  number of workers who will continue to college education in order to maintain the same composition of the two 
education groups. 
 

























β ⋅+ , respectively.  The length of lower middle school education is Nl –year; the length of upper middle school 
education is Nu –year; the length of college education is Nc -year. 
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The estimates of D (Direct Cost) 
 
Direct cost = total expenditures/ total number of students 
 




Year: 2002 Higher Education Upper Middle School  Lower Middle School
Beijing 2.8116 0.5149  0.3167
Tianjin 1.2546 0.3945  0.1367
Hebei  0.5967 0.1593  0.0623
Shanxi 0.6901 0.1753  0.0825
Inner Mongolia 0.6885 0.1491  0.0902
Liaoning 0.9439 0.2324  0.1012
Jilin  0.9738 0.2197  0.1037
Heilongjiang 0.8082 0.1367  0.0594
Shanghai 1.7431 0.4931  0.4075
Jiangsu 1.0842 0.3081  0.1235
Zhejiang 1.1719 0.3765  0.1904
Anhui  0.8645 0.1936  0.0710
Fujian  1.0761 0.2074  0.1072
Jiangxi 0.6734 0.1435  0.0677
Shandong 0.8363 0.2148  0.0891
Henan  0.5285 0.1157  0.0477  68
Hubei  1.0849 0.1880  0.0821
Hunan 0.8072 0.1850  0.0700
Guangxi 0.8064 0.1804  0.0883
Sichuan 1.0213 0.1776  0.0756
Guizhou 0.6730 0.1278  0.0530
Yunnan 0.7701 0.1881  0.0806
Shaanxi 0.9156 0.0936  0.0487
Gansu  0.8995 0.1421  0.0687
Qinghai 0.8827 0.1608  0.1028
Ningxia 0.8478 0.1394  0.0956
Xinjiang 0.6211 0.1664  0.1024
Guangdong 1.2340 0.2946  0.1231
 
Notes: 
1. All the data were collected from the 2003 Education Statistical Yearbook and the 2003 China Statistical Year Book.   
2. The total expenditure data are deflated using GDP deflator (base = Beijing, 1990). 




D. The Rate of Return to Infrastructure Investment 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: each provincial government is going to invest C dollars on infrastructure at time t.  The goal of this exercise is 
to measure the rate of return to infrastructure investment.   
o  The newly increased infrastructure would be available at the beginning of time t+1.  The rate of return is computed based on 
the service provided by the newly increased infrastructure during the time period between t+1 and t+N2. 
o  The future output in the absence of the adult education program is projected assuming all the variables stay constant, so the 
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o  The depreciation rate (R) is set to 0.06.  The initial stock of infrastructure (at time t) is assumed to be fixed at the same level 
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Based on the TFP Growth Equation, 
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i C  be the unit cost of telephone in Province i. 
Then, the investment cost is: 
t
ii i dTel Population C ⋅⋅  
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Cost estimates for the telephone 
 
The China Statistical Yearbook reports the aggregate investment in "Transportation, Storage, Postal and Telecommunication 
Services."  There is no simple way to separate telecommunication investment from transportation investment.  In order to estimate the 
cost of telecommunication, we run a simple regression model with the dependent variable defined as the average annual investment in 
transportation, storage, postal and telecommunication services between 2001 and 2002 (per 100 million yuan).  The independent 
variables are (the data on storage facility are not available) as follows: 
avg_road_01_02: average annual road construction between 2001 and 2002 (per 1,000 km). 
avg_telephone_01_02: average annual number of urban telephone subscribers increased between 2001 and 2002 (per 10,000 unit). 
 
In this exercise, we estimate the marginal cost of telecommunication infrastructure, using telephone ownership as a proxy for such 
infrastructure.  We assume that the average cost is constant and thus equals to the marginal cost.  The regression results are reported in 




Regressor Coefficient  Std  Error  t-statistc p-value 
Intercept 21.24 13.04  1.63 0.12  71
avg_road_01_02 0.27 1.02  0.26 0.79
avg_telephone_01_02 1.10 0.14  8.02 <.0001
Adjusted R-square: 0.7003 
Notes: 
1. Hainan is included in Guangdong; and Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  Tibet and Inner Mongolia are excluded for lack of continuous data. 
2. We would like to use more recent data to estimate the costs for road construction and telephone.  However, the telecommunication services are no longer 






E. Impact on Regional Ratios of Per-Capita GDP under Alternative Hypothetical Policy Scenarios in 2013 
 
Basic Assumptions: 
o  Policy scenario: the central government is going to invest in human capital or telecommunication infrastructure in the 
northeast, far west and interior regions, in order to reduce the regional per-capita output gaps.  
o  There are five phases in this investment project.  In each phase, the central government would distribute 10% of their annual 
revenue to the non-coastal provinces (weighed by their population size) to carry out the investment project.
41   
o  The first phase of the investment project would be completed at the beginning of 2004, and the last phase investment project 
would be completed at the beginning of 2008.  The impacts of those investment projects on regional inequality are evaluated at 
the end of the 10th year (2013).   
o  There are two channels through which human capital can impact on output: the direct contribution to the production process 
and the indirect contribution through the TFP growth on the production process.  For the direct contribution, each non-coastal 
provincial government would launch an adult education program to move some of the workers from the low-skilled (Ln) group 
to the high-skilled (Le) group.  For the indirect contribution, each non-coastal provincial government would launch an adult 
education program to provide education service, which is beyond the level of the nine-year compulsory education, to some of 
                                                 
41 The total government revenue is 2171.525 billion yuan in 2003.  We assume that the central government would spend 217.1525 billion yuan in each phase of 
the investment project.  For simplicity, we also assume that the unit costs of human capital and telecommunication infrastructure stay the same throughout the 
investment project, and the calculations of the unit costs are provided in Appendix A-D.   72
the workers.  The lengths of the lower middle school, upper middle school and college education are assumed to be 3-year, 3-
year and 4-year, respectively.   
o  The depreciation rate of the telecommunication infrastructure (R) is assumed to be 0.06.  The initial stock of the infrastructure 
(in 2003) is assumed to be fixed at the same level throughout the years.  The depreciation is applied only to the newly 
increased infrastructure (starting at the beginning of 2005). 
o  We assume  ,1 , ,1 , log log log log it it it it i YY T F PT F P w ++ −= − =  in projecting the “future” output and TFP in the absence of the 




log log ii y i y
y
wT F P T F P −
=





− stays constant at the 2003 level throughout the years. 
 
Direct Contribution of Human Capital:  
Let gi be the increase in the number of high-skilled workers (Le) in each phase of the investment project. 
t = 2004:  ei L Æ ei i L g +   ni L Æ 5 ni i L g − ⋅  
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Indirect Contribution of Human Capital: 
Let gi be the number of workers who are involved in the adult education program in each phase of the investment project.  The first 
phase of the investment project is completed at the beginning of 2004, but the growth rate of TFP would not be affected until in 2005 
due to the assumption of the lagged impact.  Let  ci L denote the original number of workers who have received education that is beyond 
the level of the nine-year compulsory education. 
t = 2004:  ei L Æ 4 ei i L g −⋅   ci L Æ ci i L g +  
t = 2005:  ei L Æ 3 ei i L g −⋅   ci L Æ 2 ci i L g + ⋅  
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Both Direct and Indirect Contributions of Human Capital: 
 
t = 2004:  ni L Æ 5 ni i L g −⋅   ei L Æ ei i L g +   ci L Æ ci i L g +  
t = 2005:  ni L Æ 5 ni i L g −⋅   ei L Æ 2 ei i L g + ⋅   ci L Æ 2 ci i L g + ⋅  
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Let gi be the increase in the telecommunication infrastructure in each phase of the investment project.  The first phase of the 
investment project is completed at the beginning of 2004, but the growth rate of TFP will not be affected until in 2006 due to the 
assumption of the lagged impact.      
t = 2004:  i Tel Æ ii Tel g +  
t = 2005:  i Tel Æ 2 ii Tel g +⋅  
# 
t ≥ 2008:  i Tel Æ 5 ii Tel g +⋅  
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Denote z as follows: 
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